Meaning versus matter: Lessons from life
Kampis, G.
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eötvös University Budapest, Rakoczi ut 5., H-1088 Budapest, Hungary
The lecture addresses a problem many philosophers have tackled from Brentano and Peirce through Uexkuell and Morris to Searle and Dennett. Is there a place for intentionality and meaning in a world whose best explanation is by science? We discuss von Bertalanffy and Whitehead as two examples for a philosophy which holds the promise of consistent naturalism/materialism without being eliminative or instrumentalistic. They failed for different reasons; what is common in them is that they were both motivated by biology. A re-examination of some of the issues that troubled these thinkers, and some peculiarities of biology they were aware of, may lead, I will argue, to an anti-dualistic yet not anti-mentalistic perspective that answers our question to the affirmative.
| LOCATION |
DATE |
TIME |
| Lecture Hall II |
Monday, April 6 |
09:30 am |